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Abstract 
William James (1842-1910) was
both a psychologist and philosopher
who has attained international
reputation as America’s most original
thinker.  He aroused a public interest in
philosophy in general, and
pragmatism in particular. James
rejected intellectualizing and
theorizing about religion in favor of an
empirical approach and his task
became that of articulating the way in
which experience may justify religious
beliefs.  He was a pluralist in love with
variety and with his own religious
experience.  
James’s interest in religion was in 
personal terms. The meaning and 
importance of his religious writings 
can properly be understood only in the 
light of his belief that the most fruitful 
approach to religion is an empirical 
one. His pragmatic justification for 
religious belief has often been 
challenged, on both ontological and  
moral grounds. Critics argue that 
James’s accounts of religious truth 
and its justification are perniciously 
subjective. Nevertheless, once James’s 
conceptions of religious truth and 
justification are understood in their 
full measure of depth, this charge can 
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be seen as misplaced. In this article, 
I explore James’s philosophy of 
religion in a way that enables his 
views to be understood and critiqued.
INTRODUCTION
In order to define the nature of 
religious experience, we should first 
establish what religion is and what is 
experience. The word religion does not 
stand for any single principle or entity, 
and religion has many characters which 
may in turn be equally important. 
Philosophers have various views on 
‘religion’, for example, Karl Marx 
(1818-1883),  describes religion as an 
ideological weapon of the ruling class 
which has a function that is harmful. 
John Dewey (1859-1952) finds that 
religion has a valuable function in life. 
Therefore, any singular abstract 
conception is misleading.  
Instead of being seduced into the 
theorizing fallacy of seeking a 
definition as the key to the nature of 
religion, one should inquire into its 
various meanings in human experience. 
Hence, religion has its external aspects, 
worship, sacrifice, theology, 
ceremonies, and ecclesiastical 
organizations.  It is also, in a more 
personal way, the inner dispositions 
“which form the center of his interest, 
his conscience, his helplessness, and his 
incompleteness” (James,1958,p.28). 
Nevertheless, one might argue that 
religion is not religion but a 
psychological manifestation, according 
to Sigmund Freud (1856-1939).  Freud 
sees religion as a form of wish-
fulfillment, and the dogmas of religion 
are illusions derived from deep and 
persistent wishes. 
James’s Concept of Religion 
James, in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, generally 
considers religion only in its personal 
aspect, believing that this is more 
fundamental than theological: 
“Churches, when once established, live 
at second hand upon tradition; but the 
founders of every church owed their 
power originally to the fact of their 
direct personal communion with the 
divine.  Not only the superhuman 
founders, the Christ, the Buddha, 
Mohammed, but all the originators of 
religious sects have been in this case; so 
personal religion should still seem the 
primordial thing, even to those who 
continue to esteem it incomplete” 
(James,1958,p.30). 
The meaning of religion, as one 
should generally understand it 
throughout James’s writings, is 
described in the Varieties in the 
following practical terms: “Religion, 
therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to 
take it, shall mean for us the feelings, 
acts, and experiences of individual men 
in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in 
relation to whatever they may consider 
the divine.  Since the relation may be 
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either moral, physical, or ritual, it is 
evident that out of religion in the sense 
in which we take it, theologies, 
philosophies, and ecclesiastical 
organizations may secondarily grow” 
(James, 1958, p.31).   
General Concept of Experience  
Let us examine the term 
“experience’. Everyone has had 
experiences of one sort or another. 
How then do we know what experience 
is and its derivation? Is there anything 
behind it and causing it to be as it is? 
Common sense tells us that we are in 
the universe and the experience of the 
universe is within.  James in his 
Psychology made it clear that our minds 
are directly aware of reality.  They do 
not handle offprint of something out 
there.  Objects are mainly perceived as 
independently of our thoughts.  These 
various notions do not hang together. 
For instance, how the World Trade 
Center Twin Towers in New York City 
might look like after they were 
destroyed can be a mental construct of a 
previous recollection.  
Primitive experience is entirely 
free from any general idea of the 
dependence of objects upon the 
knowing of them, there are certain 
accepted cases in which an experience 
is definitely recognized as my 
experience, which is regarded as 
deriving existence from a for-me 
relation (Perry, 1904, p.43).  This is a 
very different idea from that of the 
functioning of the sense-organs.  That I 
see and hear and taste is a 
commonplace of all experience, and I 
may study what I see without effecting 
any discontinuity in my practical or 
scientific world  of things.  But to 
believe that  what I see is constituted by 
my seeing of it, is to define a new 
realm, an anomalous science, and 
possibly a new philosophical method. 
Such a belief must arise very early in 
connection with illusory experiences.   
James’s Concept of Experience 
Experience, in James’s view, is all 
that which exists is experience and 
experience is all that exists.  There is no 
general stuff of which experience at 
large is made.  There are as many stuffs 
as there are ‘natures’ in the things 
experienced.  Experience is only a 
collective name for all these sensible 
natures.  There appears no universal 
element of which all things are made. 
Before experience can be experienced, 
it must be attended  to. James says : 
“My experience is what I agree to 
attend to. Only those items which I 
notice shape my mind – without 
selective interest, experience is an utter 
chaos.  Interest  alone  gives  accent 
and emphasis, light and shade, 
background and foreground – 
intelligible perspective, in a world” 
(James,1890, p.407).   
All our life is a mass of habits – 
practical, emotional, and intellectual – 
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systematically organized for our weal 
or woe, and bearing us irresistibly 
toward our destiny, whatever it may be. 
A new habit is formed in three stages. 
First there must be need or desire. Then 
one needs information: methods of 
learning how to maintain the habit. One 
might read books, attend classes, and 
consciously explore ways how others 
have developed the desired habit. The 
last state is simple repetition; 
consciously doing exercise or actually 
reading and speaking until the acts 
become usual and habitual 
(Wulff,1997,p.484).  For intellect there 
are two levels of knowing: Knowing 
through direct experience and knowing 
through abstract reasoning. James calls 
the first level “knowledge of 
acquaintance.” It is sensory, intuitive, 
poetic, and emotional. “I know the 
color blue when I see it, and the flavor 
of time when I feel it pass…but about 
the inner nature of these facts or what 
makes them what they are, I can say 
nothing at all” The higher level of 
knowledge James calls “Knowledge-
about.” It is intellectual, focused, and 
relational; it can develop abstractions; it 
is objective and unemotional. “When 
we know about it, we can do more than 
merely have it; we think over its 
relations, to subject it to a form of 
treatment and operate upon it with our 
thought. Through feelings we become 
acquainted with things but only with or 
thoughts do we know about them” 
(James,1890, p.221).   
James’s Concept of Religious 
Experience 
Religious experience to which men 
find themselves related in their 
religious acts and feelings may be any 
object that is godlike, whether it be a 
concrete deity or not. Religious 
experience, according to James, refers 
to man’s total reaction upon life that 
there must be something solemn, 
serious, and tender about any attitude 
which we denominate as religious.  If 
glad, it must not grin or snicker; if sad, 
it must not scream. Where a religion 
regards the world as tragic, the tragedy 
must be understood as purging; 
religious sadness, wherever it exists, 
that is, it must possess a purgatorial 
note (James, 1958, p.31).   
The nature of religious experience 
is mystical encounter.  James suggests 
that ‘mysticism’ can be construed in 
ways that accounted as much for 
Buddhist and transcendentalist 
experience as for Christian phenomena, 
even though Buddhists and 
transcendentalists do not  positively 
assume a God   in the sense of a 
superhuman person (James,1958,p.31).    
When persons encounter mysticism or 
divinity,  they  transact  with some 
objects that order the world in a way 
that protects all ideal interests.  A 
religious experience (sometimes it is 
difficult to distinguish neatly between 
“subject” and “object”) is an experience  
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of  first things in the way of being and 
power  which overarches and envelops 
other things so completely that  what 
relates to them is the first and last word 
in the way of truth (James,1958,p.34).     
 James’s Concept of Mysticism  
In defining ‘mystic’, James 
proposes that the following 4 essential 
characteristics should be involved: 
(James,1958,p.319) 
1. Ineffability.    The   subjects   of
mystical experiences say that such
an experience defines expression,
that no adequate report of the
contents can be given in words. It
follows from this that its quality
must be directly experienced; it
cannot be imparted or transferred
to others.
2. Noetic Quality.  Those who have
mystical experiences claim that
they have gotten or received
deeply significant and important
insights during the experiences.
Although so similar to states of
feeling, mystical states seem to
those who experience them to be
also states of knowledge.  They are
states of insight into depths of truth
unplumbed by the discursive
intellect.  They are illuminations,
revelations, full of significance and
importance, all inarticulate though
they remain; and as a rule they
carry with  them a curious sense  of
authority for after time.
3. Transiency.  Mystical states cannot
be sustained for long.  Except in
rare instances, half an hour, or at
most an hour or two, seems to be
the limit beyond which they fade
into the light of common day.
4. Passivity of the Subject.  Although
a person can prepare himself for
and help bring about mystical
experiences, when the
characteristic sort of consciousness
has set in, the mystic feels as if his
own will were in abeyance, and
indeed sometimes as if he were
grasped and held by a superior
power.
Furthermore, he indicates that “the
mystical feeling of enlargement, union, 
and emancipation has no specific 
intellectual content whatever of its 
own” (James, 1958, p.425). 
Mysticism contributes to 
knowledge by greatly enlarging man’s 
field of consciousness, thereby opening 
up new areas of knowledge and putting 
“rational” knowledge into truer 
perspective. 
James perceives mysticism in two 
ways:  (James, 1958, p.427)  
1. Mysticism as a distinctive state
of consciousness.
2. Mysticism as revelation of
truths  in a special manner.
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Mystical states of consciousness 
are distinguished from ordinary 
consciousness, as they elude 
articulation during and after their 
occurrence.  They are qualitatively 
cognitive because they include   objects 
of consciousness.  Unlike ordinary 
consciousness, mystical states cannot 
be sustained for long.  Those who 
encounter them will  experience  a 
surrender of themselves to someone 
higher.  Therefore, Mystical states of 
consciousness stand at the  root and 
center  of personal religious experience. 
In this article, I present both 
arguments for and criticisms directed 
against James’s nature of religious 
experience which center on the 
experience of mysticism. 
Defenses of the Nature of Religious 
Experience 
If we look at the historical past, 
James’s mystical consciousness is 
supported by important historical 
precedents like the Romantic moment, 
followers of the Yogic Samadhi 
tradition in India, and Buddhists 
seeking Dhyana cultivated “conscious-
ness of illumination”, just as the Sufis 
did among the Moslems in their 
spiritual exercises.  Mystics justify their 
claims to religious knowledge by virtue 
of their achievement through revelation 
or illumination. They claim that their 
deliverances carry the one requisite 
mark which makes them incorrigible. 
James cites people cannot assume 
that mystical claims are indubitable 
simply because they cannot point to any 
existing method for settling disputes 
about them.  James’s science of 
religions provides ways to settle 
disputes about mystical claims that 
mystics have no way to settle 
themselves.  James’s aim is to 
appreciate the mystical states of 
consciousness that generated these 
claims as well as to inspect religious 
conduct informed by them. I argue that 
the messages of mystical experiences, 
though profoundly significant for those 
directly involved, have no necessary 
binding effect on others in the sense 
that they must accept them uncritically. 
As James mentioned, there is an 
evidence from the point of view of 
psychological mechanism that the 
classical mysticism and the lower 
mysticisms spring from the same 
mental level (James,1958,p.426).  My 
point is that whatever comes must be 
shifted and tested, and run the gauntlet 
of confrontation with the total context 
of experience, just like what comes 
from the outer world of sense.  Its value 
must be ascertained by empirical 
methods, so long as we are not mystics 
ourselves. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion, 
whatever the non-mystical majority 
may believe, they should not deny the 
mystic’s right to follow his insights. As 
James states if the mystical truth that 
comes to a man proves to be a force 
that he can live by, the majority have no 
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right to order him to live in another way 
(James,1958,p.427). 
Mystical states might  result  in  the 
most energetic inspiration, but on the 
mystics own grounds, this could be 
reckoned an advantage only in case the 
inspiration were a true one. If the 
inspiration were erroneous, the energy 
would be all the more mistaken and 
misbegotten. My argument is that the 
truth of the mystic’s beliefs are verified 
in the same general way in which all 
truths are verified.  Of course, these are 
on the basis of their origination in 
experience and in terms of the fruitful 
relations which they establish with 
reality in terms of human conduct. 
Mystical beliefs are also liable to be 
erroneous just as they come from the 
outer world of sense.   Therefore, I 
argue for mysticism that derives from 
the inner sense. 
Criticisms of the Nature of Religious 
Experience 
James asserts that mystics claim to 
know something intuitively. He was 
criticized for saying that mystics know 
intuitively by since their deliverances 
are intuitive and therefore not open to 
dispute.  They are declarations based on 
evidence, but privileged evidence, 
evidence shared by the mystic and God 
alone. Therefore, mystics base their 
opinions on their own witness and on 
the authority of their own books 
reporting revelations. Levinson (1981) 
also argues against James in this point 
that  mystics do not mean that they have 
merely inferred what they claim  to 
know from other things that they know. 
Nor are they simply claiming to have a 
hunch about something.  They are 
claiming to know something 
indubitably that cannot possibly be 
inferred from other things they knew 
(Levinson, 1981,p.216). 
As James characterizes mystics this 
way, mysticism is indirect competition 
with scientific inquiry as a way of 
thinking. Although inquiry and 
mysticism share a claim to cognitivity, 
they are at odds in almost every other 
respect when the fact of a mystical 
experience is used to justify a doctrine 
of criticism.  My objection is that 
mystical states are not states in which 
reasoning takes the leading role, but 
these determine attitudes and open 
regions of experience not accessible to 
ordinary modes of thought.  They signal 
something about the meaning of 
experience that is not discovered in any 
other way.  When mysticism is taken as 
intellectually authoritative, it becomes a 
hindrance to persuasive order.  Mystics 
are honest in their own mystical 
experiences, even when these 
declarations are based on their privilege 
evidence. This process of persuasion is 
suited only to people who actively seek 
opinions in an ordered way and help 
themselves to decide what to believe. 
Levinson (1981) accuses James 
that he is struck by the references 
practically into experiences of 
deliverance investigated by 
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contemporary mystical literature. The 
question is whether this revelation is a 
cultural derivative of natural 
supernaturalism or some independent 
warrant for it.  Many Romantics, for 
example, Wordsworth places the 
“illuminated moment” at the center of 
their imagination.  They seek visions 
that efface personal consciousness and 
render it cosmic and bestowed a selfless 
perspective from which they can view 
the world of impersonal worth 
(Levinson, 1981,p.168). 
My opinion is that mysticism is not 
a marginal religious phenomenon as in 
James’s views.  Reports of illumination 
dotted both religious and secular 
histories.  The most rudimentary sort of 
illumination occurs whenever some 
deepen sense of the significance of 
something sweeps over one.   Certain  
experiences and trance states are more 
complex forms of the same 
phenomenon.  In each of these 
instances, religious person’s rational, it 
is suspended as they find themselves 
being transported from some sort of 
disturbance to a sense of mental ease, 
peace, and rest. I believe that the 
mystics who deliver their illuminations 
assert that their claims are indubitable. 
Nevertheless, James was attacked 
for his statement that the mystic cannot 
participate in religious investigation 
and there is no procedure to overcome 
the doubts of people who dispute his 
declarations.  No reasons could change 
his mind about men, gods, and the 
world.  If others accepted the mystic’s 
claims on mystical grounds, they did so 
not from force of persuasion but form 
some sort of purportedly divine 
coercion that they felt as mystics. 
Therefore, whether mystical experience 
lead to presumptive truths or not, the 
mystic presents no infallible credential. 
In response to this claim, there are 
beliefs that the thoughts of mystics are 
true and justified in some sense. An 
individual is warranted to claim that he 
is in pain once he believes he is, 
because his feelings of pain are things 
to which he has privileged access. 
Thus, mystics are justified in making 
their own claims.  As James asserts 
rationalists could throw a mystic into a 
prison or a madhouse, but they “cannot 
change his mind” (James, 1958, p.423). 
I believe that our own rational 
beliefs are based on evidence exactly 
similar in nature to that which mystics 
quote for theirs.  Just as investigators 
rely on perceptions for their claims, so 
mystics rely on face to face 
presentations of what seems 
immediately to exist. The only motive 
for investigation is to overturn doubt 
and settle belief.  
Levinson (1978) argues that if the 
illumination of mystical experience 
bringss real and living doubt to an end 
for someone, he simply has no motive 
for further investigation, no demand for 
a change of mind.  The mystic simply 
asserts that his claims are not governed 
by the logic of inquiry.  His experiences 
result in confession, not profession. 
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Indeed, because the mystic’s beliefs are 
confessional, he cannot help believing 
what he does, and so he is invulnerable 
to criticism.    Mystical states might 
extinquish the burning doubts of 
particular individuals, but that does not 
add to the veracity of the mystical 
claims.  In fact, if mystical claims are 
confessional, they are not warranted at 
all.  Reason warrant beliefs, but reason 
plays no role in confession.  Reason 
plays a role only in cases in which 
people do not confess but have to 
decide what to believe (Levinson, 
1978,p.212-4).   
My argument is that mystical states 
open up the possibility of other orders 
of truth distant from those accessible by 
ordinary means. Mystical experiences 
may represent just such a form of 
human consciousness.  Usually our 
minds are an enormously complex stew 
of thoughts, feelings, sensations, wants, 
pains, drives, daydreams and 
consciousness itself more or less aware 
of it all. To understand mystical 
consciousness in itself, the obvious 
thing would be to clear away as much 
of this internal detritus and noise as 
possible. It turns out that mystics seem 
to be doing precisely. 
I propose that the mystical 
experience’s claims must not be 
accepted uncritically.  My point is  that 
mystical experiences be subjected to the 
same tests applied to rational beliefs. 
Our own  rational  beliefs are based on 
evidence exactly similar in nature to 
that which mystics quote for.  Our 
senses  have assured us of certain states 
of fact. But mystical experiences are as 
direct perceptions of fact for those who 
have them. 
Nevertheless, the religious 
experiences offered to mankind through 
mystical phenomena require selection 
and subordination just as the 
experiences which come in the 
ordinary world.   Possibilities of error 
and deception occur in dealing with 
mystical experiences just as they do 
with the more ordinary ones.  But in 
testing the validity of mystical data, one 
must not impose upon them the same 
requirements imposed upon knowledge 
coming from “rational” sources.  To do 
so would automatically eliminate all 
mystical experiences from the very start 
because they are so different from the 
experiences found in man’s normal 
range of consciousness. 
CONCLUSION
James denies the word “religion” to 
any single principle or essence.  The 
name is a collective word for a huge 
number of different experiences, and 
the proper job of investigating religion 
must be to consider very specific 
examples of all the different 
manifestations of human experiences. 
For  him,  all  questions  of  value  have 
to  meet  the  text  of  experience.  And 
by experience he does not mean 
something with a capital E. He means 
experiences, the active consequences, 
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which occur in the lives of particular 
individuals. 
Religious experience is identified 
as having a transcendent meaning 
within experience that causal
investigations can only identify in terms 
of proximate origin. In this case, 
mystical experience is often cited as a 
human experience that suggests the 
validity of language and concepts 
protected within religious traditions. 
Among specifically religious practices, 
some forms of prayer have been 
investigated as producing a unique 
experiential awareness of the world that 
is both meaningful and productive of 
personal contentment. The availability 
of a religious language has been shown 
to facilitate the report of religious 
experience, and for some theorists, to 
be necessary for the experience to 
occur. Others have provided data and 
argument to show that both religious 
persons and not religiously committed 
persons may have similar experiences 
which they simply differentially 
interpret. The widest variety of 
religious experiences are documented to 
be common in modern cultures for 
human beings.
Religious ideas do not exist for us 
to contemplate or argue about 
abstractly. They exist for us to use. 
They  are,  in effect,  to use  the favorite  
metaphor of many later pragmatists, 
tools which we use to achieve our 
human  purposes.  If  they  work  for us, 
they are good (just like tools); if they 
serve no purpose, they are without 
value or truth for us, and anything 
which has no connection with the 
practical experiences of our action is 
irrelevant. This view of religion enables 
James to endorse religious experience 
as essential, for it provides us with 
practical benefits in a way that no other 
form of experience can.   
I propose that in the nature of 
religious experience, must become a 
critical and inductive science of 
religions. On such grounds, it may hope 
some day to gain acceptance even by 
non-religious people, just as the facts of 
optics are acknowledged by those who 
are born blind.  But just as optics would 
not exist were it not for the experiences 
of seeing individuals, in the same way 
the science of religions is based on the 
evidence afforded by religious persons; 
and it will never be in a position to 
decide whether in the end these 
experiences themselves are illusory. 
This last question of the objective and 
absolute significance of religious 
phenomena will be impossible to solve 
scientifically, and it will always be for 
the individual either to leave it open to 
settle it by an act of personal 
experience. 
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